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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Arthur Greydanus appeals from the district court’s Order of Restitution.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Greydanus and his son, Joseph, got into an altercation with Jimmy Bailey, during which
Greydanus hit Mr. Bailey in the head with a stick and Joseph hit Mr. Bailey in the head with a
bat. (R., pp.17-18; 6/5/18 Tr., p.15, L.16 – p.17, L.2, p.25, L.12 – p.26, L.3.) The state charged
Greydanus with aggravated battery. (R., pp.42-43.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Greydanus
pled guilty to an amended charge of misdemeanor battery for “unlawfully and intentionally
caus[ing] bodily harm, to-wit: a head injury, to the person of Jimmy Bailey against his will.” (R.,
pp.78-80; 1/5/18 Tr., p.5, L.19 – p.9, L.15.) The district court accepted Greydanus’s plea,
entered judgment, and gave the state additional time to seek restitution. (R., pp.78, 85-86;
1/30/18 Tr., p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.2.)
The court held a joint restitution hearing in Greydanus’s and Joseph’s cases on June 5,
2018. (See generally R., pp.92-93; 6/5/18 Tr.) At that hearing, the state called two witnesses:
Erika Chown, “a financial recovery officer for the State of Idaho, crime victims compensation
program” (hereinafter “CVCP”), and Mr. Bailey. (6/5/18 Tr., p.9, L.9 – p.13, L.22, p.15, L.16 –
p.30, L.5.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the state requested that Greydanus be required to
pay $25,000 in restitution to the CVCP to compensate it for the money it had expended to pay the
medical expenses Mr. Bailey incurred as a result of the battery. (6/5/18 Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33,
L.4.) Of that amount, $11,047.97 was for Life Flight services Mr. Bailey required the day after
the battery. (See 6/5/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-25, p.28, L.15 – p.29, L.2; State’s Exhibit 1.) Greydanus
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objected to the restitution request and, specifically, to the request for reimbursement of the Life
Flight expenses, arguing it was “an unnecessary expense that [Greydanus] should not be held
accountable for because [Mr. Bailey] was flight-lifted the next day” and “[a]nything could have
happened between that night and the next day to cause injury or cause him to be life-flighted to
Kootenai Medical.” (6/5/18 Tr., p.33, L.25 – p.34, L.15.) The district court ultimately granted
the state’s request and awarded restitution to the CVCP in the amount of $25,000, finding that all
of the losses the CVCP sustained were attributable to Greydanus’s criminal conduct. 1 (6/5/18
Tr., p.35, L.11-22, p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.10; R., pp.94-96.) Greydanus filed a notice of appeal
timely from the district court’s Order of Restitution. (R., pp.97-99.)
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The court declined to order that Joseph be jointly and severally liable for the restitution because
Joseph only pled guilty to assault, not battery. (6/5/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-18, p.36, Ls.12-15.)
2

ISSUE
Greydanus states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Greydanus to pay
$25,000 in restitution to the CVCP?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Greydanus failed to show the district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution to the
CVCP for the economic losses it sustained, on behalf of Mr. Bailey, as a direct result of
Greydanus’s criminal conduct?
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ARGUMENT
Greydanus Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding
Restitution To The CVCP For The Economic Losses It Sustained As A Direct Result Of
Greydanus’s Criminal Conduct
A.

Introduction
Greydanus challenges the district court’s Order of Restitution, arguing the state failed to

present sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between certain of the economic
losses the CVCP sustained on Mr. Bailey’s behalf and Greydanus’s charged criminal conduct.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.) Specifically, Greydanus argues the “state did not establish causation
for Mr. Bailey’s Life Flight medical expenses.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7 (capitalization altered,
underlining omitted).) Greydanus’s argument fails. A review of the record shows the state
presented substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that the CVCP’s economic
losses, including the $11,047.97 in Life Flight expenses, were the direct result of Greydanus’s
criminal conduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s discretion

and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).’” State
v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43
P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002)).

In determining whether the district court has abused its

discretion, the appellate court considers “whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
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with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing
Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)).
“The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to be decided by the trial
court.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875,
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)). “The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution will
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Lombard,
149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010)); accord State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,
885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276 (citing
Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990)); accord Wisdom, 161
Idaho at 919, 393 P.3d at 579.

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court’s Finding That The $11,047.97 The
CVCP Expended For The Payment Of Mr. Bailey’s Life Flight Services Was Caused By
Greydanus’s Criminal Conduct
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to “order a defendant found guilty of any

crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim.” For
purposes of restitution, “economic loss” includes, among other things, “direct out-of-pocket
losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct.” I.C. § 195304(1)(a) (emphasis added). “Therefore, in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be
a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401.
Causation, for purposes of the restitution statutes, “consists of actual cause and true
proximate cause.” Id. (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)).

5

The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated the distinction between actual and proximate cause as
follows:
Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced a
particular consequence. The “but for” test is used in circumstances where there is
only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes were not acting
concurrently. On the other hand, true proximate cause deals with whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the negligent conduct. In
analyzing proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and
manner of occurrence are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not
have reasonably expected the injury to occur.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The determinations of actual cause and proximate
cause are both factual questions. Id.
In cases such as this, where restitution for “treatment expenses are sought, the State bears
the initial burden to make a prima facie showing, which may include evidence that would be
inadmissible in a civil trial, that the expenses were reasonable and necessary to treat injuries
caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.” State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114-15, 190 P.3d
930, 933-34 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). Ultimately, an award of restitution must “be
based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant,
victim or presentence investigator.” I.C. § 19-5304(6). “Strict application of evidentiary rules is
not required for proof of restitution claims,” however, as the restitution statute itself “explicitly
lowers one evidentiary bar in restitution hearings by allowing the court to consider ‘such hearsay
as may be contained in the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to
the court.’” Card, 146 Idaho at 114, 190 P.3d at 933 (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(6)).
In this case, Greydanus’s liability for restitution arose from his guilty plea to having
battered Mr. Bailey by “unlawfully and intentionally caus[ing] bodily harm, to-wit: a head injury,
to the person of Jimmy Bailey against his will.” (R., pp.78-80; 1/5/18 Tr., p.5, L.19 – p.8, L.15.)
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See I.C. § 19-5304(2). After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered Greydanus to pay
restitution in the amount of $25,000 to the CVCP, finding Mr. Bailey’s medical bills, including
his Life Flight expenses, resulted from the battery to which Greydanus had pled guilty. (6/5/18
Tr., p.35, Ls.14-22, p.36, L.20 – p.37, L.10.) Contrary to Greydanus’s arguments on appeal, a
review of the record shows the state presented substantial evidence to support the district court’s
restitution award and, more specifically, its finding that the economic losses the CVCP 2
sustained for the payment of Mr. Bailey’s Life Flight expenses were caused by Greydanus’s
criminal conduct.
Mr. Bailey testified that he sustained a head injury as a result of Greydanus and Joseph
hitting him in the head with a stick and a bat. (6/5/18 Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.2, p.25, L.12 –
p.26, L.3; see also State’s Exhibit 3 (photograph of head laceration).) Mr. Bailey required
immediate medical attention for his injury and was transported to the hospital by emergency
medical services for treatment. (6/5/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-18.) He was released but “ended up being
life-flighted” back to the hospital the next day, and he remained hospitalized for five days.
(6/5/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.18-22, p.28, L.21 – p.29, L.2.) Mr. Bailey testified that he has had epilepsy
since he was a teenager and has had seizures in the past, but the head injury he sustained as a
result of the battery “has made it worse.” (6/5/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24, p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.5.)
Mr. Bailey testified that the Idaho Industrial Commission paid “most[]” of his medical
expenses. (6/5/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.1-18.) State’s Exhibit 1, introduced by the state at the restitution

2

Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) and (iv), respectively, define “victim” as “a person or entity, who
suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct …” and as “[a]
person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or entity has made payments to
or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to a contract ….” Greydanus has never
disputed that the CVCP is a “victim” within the meaning of the restitution statute.
7

hearing, is a letter and payment summary from the Industrial Commission’s CVCP indicating
that the CVCP made payments in the total amount of $25,000 on behalf of Mr. Bailey—
including 11,047.97 for Life Flight services—and that it did so directly in relation to Greydanus’s
and Joseph’s criminal cases. (State’s Exhibit 1.) Erika Chown, the CVCP financial recovery
officer through whose testimony Exhibit 1 was introduced, also confirmed that the payments the
CVCP made on Mr. Bailey’s behalf were “in relation to Arthur and Joseph Greydanus as
defendants.” (6/5/18 Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.8.) When asked how the CVCP arrives at the
dollar amounts it disburses in each case, Ms. Chown testified:
We determine eligibility for the program based on statutory requirements,
and then we request all bills related to the incident, review of medical records for
crime relatedness of treatment, and then apply a medical fee schedule to render
payments that are deemed customary and reasonable.
(6/5/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-12 (emphases added).) Referring specifically to the payments the CVCP
made on Mr. Bailey’s behalf, Ms. Chown testified that the CVCP had received “actual bills from
the[] providers” of the medical services listed in Exhibit 1 “to establish the amounts.” (6/5/18
Tr., p.13, Ls.6-15.)
Greydanus’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the foregoing evidence
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the district award of restitution to the CVCP. Viewed
collectively, that evidence shows that the payments the CVCP made on Mr. Bailey’s behalf
covered expenses he incurred for the treatment of injuries that, according to both Mr. Bailey and
Ms. Chown, were related to the battery. (See
- - 6/5/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-12, p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.2,
p.19, Ls.9-25.) Because the evidence shows the $11,047.97 the CVCP expended for Life Flight
services was “crime related[]” (6/5/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-12), Greydanus has failed to show the
district court abused its discretion by awarding the requested restitution.
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Greydanus challenges the district court’s award of restitution for Mr. Bailey’s Life Flight
expenses, arguing as he did below that, because “Mr. Bailey has a history of seizures and
epilepsy, … ‘[a]nything could have happened between that night and the next day to cause injury
or cause him to be life-flighted ….’” (Appellant’s brief, p.8 (quoting 6/5/18 Tr., p.34, Ls.5-7).)
Greydanus’s argument is without merit. The state was not required to disprove the speculative
possibility that Mr. Bailey required Life Flight services the day after Greydanus battered him for
reasons that were unrelated to the head injury he sustained as a result of the battery. The state
presented evidence that the Life Flight expenses were “crime related[]” (6/5/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.512, p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.8, p.11, L.16 – p.13, L.15, p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.2, p.19, Ls.9-25), and that
evidence was more than sufficient to support the district court’s award of restitution for those
expenses.
Moreover, even accepting Greydanus’s invitation to speculate that “anything could have
happened between” the time of the battery and the time Mr. Bailey was transported by Life Flight
to the hospital, such does not demonstrate a lack of a causal connection between the battery and
the need for the Life Flight services. In order to prove Greydanus’s charged criminal conduct
was the actual cause of the injuries for which Mr. Bailey required Life Flight services, the state
was required to prove either that the injuries would not have occurred “but for” the charged
conduct, or that the charged “conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injur[ies],
even if two or more possible causes may have produced the injur[ies].” Wisdom, 161 Idaho at
921, 393 P.3d at 581 (citations omitted). Although Greydanus appears to believe otherwise,
under the latter test, the state was not required to prove that Greydanus’s charged conduct was
the sole cause of Mr. Bailey’s injuries; rather, the state was required to prove only that the
charged conduct was a substantial factor among potentially “multiple independent forces that
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may have caused or contributed to the harm.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Applying this test to the facts of this case, there can be no question the state met its burden. Even
assuming some other unidentified force may have contributed to the need for Mr. Bailey to be
transported by Life Flight to the hospital, the evidence shows that Greydanus’s conduct in
battering Mr. Bailey was at least a substantial factor in bringing about that result. (See 6/5/18
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-12 (CVCP only pays for crime related treatment), p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.2, p.19,
Ls.9-25 (Mr. Bailey testifying that medical treatment he required for head injury he sustained as a
result of Greydanus’s conduct included “EMS” transport to hospital on day of attack, Life Flight
transport to hospital the next day, and hospitalization for five days).)
The state presented substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that the
CVCP’s economic losses, including the $11,047.97 in Life Flight expenses, were actually caused
by Greydanus’s criminal conduct. Greydanus has thus failed to show the district court abused its
discretion by awarding the requested restitution.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s Order of
Restitution.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of April, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/dd
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